HomeResearch LibraryFrom Secure Agentic AI to Secure Agentic Web: Challenge…
Chapter 4 · 2026

From Secure Agentic AI to Secure Agentic Web: Challenges, Threats, and Future Directions

Zhihang Deng, Jiaping Gui, Weinan Zhang

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agentic systems that plan, memorize, and act in open-world environments. This shift brings new security problems: failures are no longer only unsafe text generation, but can become real harm through tool use, persistent memory, and interaction with untrusted web content. In this survey, we provide a transition-oriented view from Secure Agentic AI to a Secure Agentic Web. We first summarize a component-aligned threat taxonomy covering prompt abuse, environment injection, memory attacks, toolchain abuse, model tampering, and agent network attacks. We then review defense strategies, including prompt hardening, safety-aware decoding, privilege control for tools and APIs, runtime monitoring, continuous red-teaming, and protocol-level security mechanisms. We further discuss how these threats and mitigations escalate in the Agentic Web, where delegation chains, cross-domain interactions, and protocol-mediated ecosystems amplify risks via propagation and composition. Finally, we highlight open challenges for web-scale deployment, such as interoperable identity and authorization, provenance and traceability, ecosystem-level response, and scalable evaluation under adaptive adversaries. Our goal is to connect recent empirical findings with system-level requirements, and to outline practical research directions toward trustworthy agent ecosystems.

Eigenvector Insight — Zone III / PASF-PADE AnalysisNot part of the original paper
Eigenvector Research — Marco van Hurne
How this paper contributes to solving the Zone III problem (PASF-PADE)

This paper directly addresses one of the core structural challenges in Zone III deployments. The research on Agentic AI, LLMs, Security provides evidence-based foundations that enterprise architects cannot ignore when designing long-horizon autonomous workflows. The findings challenge the assumption that a base language model — however capable — can handle the complexity of durable, governed, multi-step execution without explicit architectural intervention. For Zone III practitioners, this paper belongs in the required reading list.

Why AI is not sufficient for Zone III without this

Zone III refers to high-complexity, high-risk, long-running agentic workflows — the class of enterprise AI deployments where a single failure can cascade across hundreds of steps. Standard AI models, trained to predict the next token, are not inherently designed for durable, governed, multi-step execution. This paper addresses one or more of the structural gaps that make Zone III deployments unsafe without explicit architectural intervention.

Topics

Agentic AILLMsSecurityThreatsDefensesAgentic WebPrompt AbuseMemory Attacks